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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
TAYLOR-WEST WEBER WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Civil No. 20080504-SC

v.
JERRY D. OLDS, State Engineer of the
State of Utah; WEBER BASIN
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
a political subdivision of the State of
Utah; and UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION,
Defendants and
Appellees,
ROY CITY,
Intervenor and Appellant.

REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(f) and (4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).

ISSUE PRESENTED
Can Roy City intervene on de novo review of the State Engineer's administrative
decision where Roy City failed to meet the statutory deadline for submitting a protest and
was, therefore, not a party to the State Engineer administrative adjudication?
The trial court's decision on a question of law is reviewed for correctness.
Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ^[2, 20 P.3d 895.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(l). Scope and applicability of chapter.
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a
statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter,
the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern:
(a) state agency action that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges,
immunities, or other legal interests of an identifiable person, including
agency action to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw,
or amend an authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103. Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
* * * *

(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer
to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or
agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-203. Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudicative
proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by rule,
prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include the
following:
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authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative
proceeding."3
Roy City failed to protest Taylor-West's application within 20 days of the
published notice. Rather, the City sent the State Engineer a letter some six months after
the protest deadline and after the State Engineer held a hearing on the application. R.
178-179. Since the City did not file a protest within the statutory time limit, it was not
a party in the State Engineer's informal administrative proceeding. Because UAPA
explicitly prohibits intervention in informal proceedings,4 Roy City could not become a
party to that proceeding.
Displeased with the State Engineer's conditional approval of its application,
Taylor-West sought de novo review of the State Engineer decision in the Second District
Court (R.1-48), and appropriately named the other parties to the State Engineer's
administrative proceeding as defendants in the de novo review. R. 2-3. Subsequently,
Roy City sought to intervene in the trial court's de novo judicial proceeding. R. 146-148.
After hearing oral argument, Judge Heffernan denied Roy City's intervention motion.
R. 235-239. Roy City, by this appeal, seeks reversal.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103(l)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). The UAPA
was renumbered in 2008. The substance was unaltered.
4

See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-203(l)(g) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
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Utah Code Ann. § 6HG-4«I02< i) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
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Further, sound public policy supports excluding intervenors from de novo review
proceedings. Allowing Roy City to intervene at the de novo review stage would permit
an intervenor to bypass agency proceedings, undermine Section 73-3-7 and the State
Engineer's authority to require timely protests, deprive trial courts of the State
Engineer's expertise on certain issues, and chill the State Engineer's ability to gather and
consider information from disparate sources.
The City argues that Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs
intervention and trumps the statutory requirement to protest within 20 days of published
notice.10

But, a Court rule cannot contravene statutes governing administrative

proceedings and court review of those proceedings.
BACKGROUND--£>£ NOVO REVIEW OF STATE ENGINEER DECISIONS
The State Engineer's Office receives thousands of applications annually to
appropriate water, change uses under existing rights, and for other proposed actions.
Water rights are treated as real property "incorporeal hereditaments"1 ] and are, by nature,
"usufructary."12 Because the rights are incorporeal, Utah water law ties the right to a
"beneficial use" that gives definition and substance to the right.13 The beneficial use
10

See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004).

11

In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1954).

12

Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah 1949). A usufruct is the
right to "us[e] and enjoy[] and receiv[e] the profits of property that belongs to
another[J" Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (6th ed. 1990).
13

Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (West 2004).
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essentially /*> uie right and, because most water rights «re iiicAtrieably intertwined with
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also United Sidles v. DIM Hi t (\)un <.»/ the Fourth Judicial District in and jo* !Jt'ih
County, 238 P.2d 1 132, 1134 (Utah \{)5 1 Hhcremafter U.S. v. Fourrh Distri. :
Coun\("\hc |State] Engineer must investigate and hear e\ ideiKe ot ,al ..iiei. Med
parties and ]u -h'U'ld ;.ni.',.\r <>? m o t [appropriation and ehangel applications").

16

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-2 (West 2004).

17

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(2) (West 2004).

'h •19

• " 8 0V- . ^ •> • ' npp.2007).

See id.
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the goal of determining whether an applicant meets approval criteria.20

This

investigation, combined with consideration of protests, informs the State Engineer's
decision whether to approve or reject an application.
State Engineer administrative proceedings are, by rule, informal unless otherwise
designated.21 Due process rights are preserved by allowing a person harmed by a State
Engineer decision who has exhausted his administrative remedies to seek judicial review
of the decision.22 UAPA provides that a party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
a final agency action23 and that "district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings" such as
those the State Engineer conducts.24 This de novo review essentially replicates the State
Engineer's process. To initiate such an action a person must have been a party in the
State Engineer's administrative process.25 As the court proceeds with judicial review,
it does not act as an appellate body, instead it "hold[s] a new trial rather than reviewing

20

For an application to appropriate, those criteria appear in Utah Code Ann. §
73-3-8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
21

Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-2 (2006).

22

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (West 2004) (amended 2008); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
23

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(l) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).

24

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(l)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).

25

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401; Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 770 (Utah
1996); See also, S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990).

8

the informal record."26 While the Court owes no formal deference to the State
Engineer's decision,27 "failure to make known the nature of one's rights in the course of
an administrative proceeding clearly disentitles a party from raising its claim for the first
time before a district court on de novo review."28 Before approving an application, the
State Engineer must "determine . . . no vested water right will be impaired . . . . On
plenary review, the trial court has the same obligation."29 In the judicial setting, "the
applicant must proceed under and be governed by the same statutory provisions as would
have been applicable had his application been approved by the state engineer."30
The Utah Supreme Court has defined and reinforced the district court's role in the
de novo review of State Engineer decisions, most recently in Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co.31
where the Court said: "[T]he state engineer's decision to approve or reject an application
'is administrative in nature and purpose[,] and the decision of the court on review, except
for the formalities of the trial and judgment, is of the same nature and for the same

26

Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Utah

27

Id.

1995).

28

Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996) (quoting S &
G. Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1085 (Utah 1990)).
29

Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983).

30

Eardley v. Terry, 11 P.2d 362, 366 (Utah 1938).

31

2006UT16, 133P.3d382.

9

purpose.'"32 U.S. v. Fourth District Court33 says it this way: "[the district court] should
simply determine whether the application was rightly rejected. To answer that question,
the court stands in the same position as the state engineer did. It must determine from
the evidence whether [the application meets the criteria]."34 Searle summarizes:
Accordingly, the conclusion is inescapable that a district court, when
reviewing the state engineer's decision to approve or reject an application,
is not sitting in its capacity as an adjudicator of rights, but is merely
charged with ensuring that the state engineer correctly performed an
administrative task. We stated as much in Eardley, when we
acknowledged that, when conducting a de novo review of the state
engineer's approval or rejection of an application, the court simply
"determines whether the application should be approved or rejected and
does not fix the rights of the parties beyond the determination of that
matter." 77 P.2d at 365.[35]
Decades of case law demonstrate that de novo review in district court is to
determine, a second time, whether the application should be approved or rejected.36 The

32

Id. at % 34 (emphasis supplied) (quoting U.S. v. Fourth District Court, 238
P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951), and citing to Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1983) (stating that when a district court reviews the state engineer's approval or
denial of an application, "[t]he issues. . . [are] strictly limited to those which were, or
could have been, raised before the State Engineer")).
33

238 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951).

34

Matll35.

35

S^r/e,2006UT16at<|[35.

* See id.
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applicant bears the burden of proof to persuade the court (initially, the State Engineer),
that there is reason to believe the application meets the approval requirements.37
Here, Roy City seeks party status, by intervention, which should be denied
because it contradicts appropriate de novo review and contravenes UAPA's intent
regarding who may take part in administrative and court review proceedings.
In this regard, in addition to the State Engineer, who acts as decision-maker in his
own proceedings, and whose joinder is required in the de novo review of his
administrative decisions,38 persons may play one of three roles in such proceedings.
They may be: (1) "parties," — i.e., the applicant and timely protestants; (2) "informants,"
who in one way or another become involved in the State Engineer's investigation or
informal process but do not file a protest within the 20 days allowed under Section 73-37;39 or (3) "non-participants" — those who neither protested, nor were involved in the
informal process — in short, the rest of the world.
Because the statutes are clear concerning the role of parties in the de novo review
of a State Engineer decision, the analysis below begins there. After explaining the
statutory law governing parties, related legal principles are used to explain the policy

37

/</.at!31.

38

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(2) (West 2004).

39

These might include neighbors who respond to State Engineer
investigational queries, expert reports, or those who object to the application outside
of Section 73-3-7, each of which could be referred to in the State Engineer's order.
11

reasons for excluding non-participants and informants from the de novo review process.
A statute governs the State Engineer's role in such proceedings: he "shall be joined as
a defendant in all suits to review his decision."40
ARGUMENT
1.

ROY CITY DOES NOT SATISFY UAPA's DEFINITION OF "PARTY" FOR
BOTH STATE AGENCY ACTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THOSE
ACTIONS.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) defines "party" as:
the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all
respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to intervene in
the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding^41]

Roy City fits none of these four definitions. First, it did not commence the proceeding.
Second, it was not a respondent against whom the agency commenced an action. Third,
it was not permitted by the State Engineer's Office (the presiding officer) to intervene.42
Fourth, Roy City could have but did not meet the statutory criteria to become "authorized
by statute or agency rule to participate as [a] part[y] in the adjudicative proceeding."

40

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(2) (West 2004).

41

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).

42

UAPA prohibits intervention in informal proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §
63G-4-203(l)(g) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). State Engineer rules conform with
UAPA in this regard. Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-8 (2005). UAPA's definition of
"party" includes potential intervenors in subsection 63G-4-103(f) because both
formal adjudicative proceedings and declaratory orders allow intervention. Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-207 and § 63G-4-503(4).

12

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004), which governs protests to applications
submitted to the State Engineer says:
Any person interested may file a protest with the state engineer... within
20 days after the [Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6] notice is published, if the
adjudicative proceeding is informal; . . . . The state engineer shall
consider the protest and shall approve or reject the application.
A protestant who files his protest within 20 days of public notice of an application filed
with the State Engineer's office, becomes a "party" by UAPA definition. But Roy City
did not submit information to the State Engineer until six months after the 20-day
statutory limit elapsed. Therefore, as Roy City concedes, it meets no criterion to be
considered a party under UAPA.43
Roy City argues that its lack of party status in the State Engineer administrative
proceeding is immaterial because, in the de novo review setting the Rules of Civil
Procedure govern party status.44 And UAPA does generally direct that during de novo
review, proceedings are "governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."45 This
argument, however, overlooks that UAPA also, and more specifically, defines "party"
for the judicial review of agency actions:
Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a
statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter,

43

Appellant's Br. at 10, 12.

44

Appellant's Br. at 9-13.

45

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(2)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
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the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern. . .
judicial review of the action.46
In the judicial review of agency action, this more specific statute governs over the
general direction to use the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in Section 63G-4-402(2)(b).
Thus, parties are limited by Section 63G-4- 103(f) to (1) those who commenced the
adjudicative proceeding (Taylor-West - by filing its application to appropriate water);
(2) all respondents to an agency action (not applicable here);47 (3) all persons permitted
by the agency's "presiding officer" to intervene in the administrative proceeding (no
intervention was or could have been allowed here); and (4) persons authorized by statute
or agency rule to participate as parties in the adjudicative proceeding (in other words
timely protestants under Section 73-3-7, i.e. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District
and United States of America Bureau of Reclamation in this case). Since Roy City
agrees it meets no criterion to be considered a party under UAPA,48 it does not meet the
definition of "party" for purposes of judicial review under Section 63G-4-102(l). It
cannot, therefore, be a party in the judicial review of the action.

46

Utah Code Ann. 63G-4-102(1) (emphasis supplied).

47

UAPA defines "Respondent" as "a person against whom an adjudicative
proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency or any other person." Utah Code Ann. §
63G-4-103(l)(i).
48

Appellant's Br. at 10,12.
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Those who miss the 20-day deadline to file a protest in the State Engineer's
administrative proceeding49 may not intervene before the State Engineer and should not
be allowed to intervene in the de novo review proceedings.
Besides the statutory directives regarding party status, and thus intervention,
sound policy undergirds UAPA and yields additional reasons for excluding Roy City
from the judicial review of Taylor-West's application. The remainder of the brief
explains the legal and policy reasons for UAPA properly excluding both "nonparticipants" and "informants" from intervening on de novo review.
2.

INTERVENTION BY NON-PARTICIPANTS IN THE COURT'S DE NOVO
REVIEW OF STATE ENGINEER ORDERS WOULD EVISCERATE THE
STATE ENGINEER PROCESS AND DISRUPT THE EXPECTATIONS OF
WATER USERS' AND OTHERS IMPACTED BY THEIR USE.
In this matter, Roy City requests this Court to significantly alter the historic water

right application decision and review process. It asserts that anyone, even nonparticipants, may intervene in de novo review of a State Engineer decision. But, this
would thwart the exhaustion doctrine, which requires parties to pursue all available
administrative remedies before seeking de novo review.50
The Supreme Court has said:
The requirement of participation [in the State Engineer's administrative
proceedings] as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of the

49

See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(l)(a) (West 2004).

50

Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18,118, 184 P.3d 578, 584; see S &
G, /nc.,797P.2datl087.
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doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well settled under
this doctrine that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative
agencies "may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to
such agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to
determine...matters properly determinable originally by such agencies."[51]
The Court concluded its opinion by saying: "we hold that [plaintiff] S & G lacks
standing to [seek de novo review] because it waived its right to participate [in the de
novo review] by its intentional inaction at the administrative level."52 This is consistent
with the whole tenor of UAPA - to be considered a party, you must be a party from the
outset.53
Yet Roy City argues that the trial court should have overlooked a putative
intervener's failure to timely protest the administrative action below because, in a de
novo review action, Rule 24 alone may grant entry to an action without regard to
participation in the State Engineer's administrative process. As Roy City states it, "[t]he
Utah statutory and regulatory framework does not impose any restrictions on a late

51

S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990). Similarly,
referring to a situation where a protestant filed almost four months after the protest
deadline, the court said: "Clearly, Mr. Prisbrey lacked standing, as a matter of law, to
challenge the change application proceedings, having failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by filing a timely protest to the state engineer." Prisbrey v.
Bloomington Water Co., 2003 UT 56, <I 26, 82 P.3d 1119, 1125.
52

S&G,lnc,

797P.2datl088.

53

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401; Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 770 (Utah
1996) (litigant may not skip administrative adjudicative proceedings).
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protestant from intervening in an ongoing proceeding for judicial review . . . other than
as set forth in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."54
The Utah Supreme Court has recently explained, in Western Water, LLC v. Olds,55
the importance of exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of State Engineer
decision-making:
The basic purpose underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within
its special competence - to make a factual record, to apply its expertise,
and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies.[56]
As Western Water demonstrates, requiring exhaustion allows the State Engineer, with
his acknowledged expertise in water matters, to initially address issues related to the
application and all protests taken together in deciding an issue related to the application
before him. Allowing non-participants to become parties after the State Engineer
renders his decision and to then raise any issue they find newly convenient denigrates the
agency process, negates the role of exhaustion, and significantly increases burdens on
trial courts to determine issues.
The administrative process, on which applicants and practitioners rely, as well as
subsequent de novo review proceedings in court, provide for the orderly allocation,

54

Appellant's Br. at 11.

55

2008 UT 18.

56

Id. at 18 (quoting Maverik Country Stores v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944,
947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)).
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distribution, and administration of the state's water. Without this orderly process, harm
may result. Likewise, those who rely on the certainty of water right decisions — water
users, lienholders, security interest holders, and others - would be significantly less
certain about the outcome of what amounts to a wide-open decision-making process.
Similarly, parties not only have the responsibility to exhaust their administrative
remedies by participating before the State Engineer, but to raise their issues to him as
well. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.57 requires that when an applicant initiates a State
Engineer action, protesters must make themselves and their issues known if those issues
are to be considered in subsequent de novo review proceedings.58 In Badger, the Court
found that even requiring the State Engineer to discern, from his own records, which
water rights a protestant owns "would eviscerate the requirement that it is the protesters'
responsibility to make known the nature of their protest before the State Engineer."59
Badger relied on S & G, Inc. v. Morgan in which plaintiff contended his participation in
the administrative process did not matter.60 The Supreme Court responded:
[Plaintiff's] interpretation ignores policy considerations which apply to all
administrative decision making. A requirement of participation at agency
level ensures that those who have an interest will bring to the agency's
attention all relevant facts and considerations at the time the agency makes
its decision. Moreover, the requirement of participation gives the agency
57

966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998).

58

Id. at 847.

59

Af. at 849.

60

Id.
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and the other participants notice of the identity and concern of interested
parties.[61]
Without having the relevant facts and all parties before it, State Engineer
decisions are, in a sense, tentative, leaving trial courts in de novo review actions to
discern what the State Engineer may have thought about this matter or that. Such a
process is untenable because the State Engineer, the legislatively-designated water expert
for the State,62 has no opportunity to deliberate and rule on vital issues raised by new
parties for the first time in the de novo review setting. Thus, in the same way parties lack
standing to challenge change application proceedings if they fail to exhaust
administrative remedies by not participating in administrative proceedings or
participating in an untimely fashion,63 they waive their right to intervene in the judicial
review of such proceedings as well.
Allowing Roy City to decide where and when it, or anyone, wants to become a
"party" undercuts the 20 day protest deadline64 and significantly shifts current
expectations of Utah water users who subject themselves to and participate in the State
Engineer's administrative process. If a person may intervene in de novo review
proceedings without prior notice, as long as he meets the relatively low standards of Rule

61

S &G, Inc., 191 P.2d at 10S1.

62

See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-2-1 through 73-2-11.

63

See id.; Prisbrey, 2003 UT 56, \ 26.

64

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004).
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24, established administrative process is disrupted and those who rely upon and
participate in the process, as well as other vested water rights holders, could be harmed.
3.

ALLOWING UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE DENOVO REVIEW PROCESS
BY PERMITTING "INFORMANTS" - SUCH AS ROY CITY - TO
INTERVENE WILL EVISCERATE THE STATE ENGINEER'S ROLE AS
WATER ADMINISTRATOR AND WILL UNDERMINE THE DE NOVO
REVIEW.
Roy City "participated" untimely in the State Engineer action - it provided

information to the State Engineer that the State Engineer mentioned in his Order. The
State Engineer's Order points out that "[a]fter the hearing was held, Roy City sent a
letter of concern dated October 10, 2006. While Roy City's concerns were considered
in the development of this Order, the City is not considered a protestant with legal
standing."65 Informants in an informal proceeding, however, should not be treated the
same as parties who complied with statutory requirements to file timely protests.
When the State Engineer receives an application to appropriate or to change the
attributes of a water right, he routinely investigates issues raised by the application,
including on-the-ground issues in the area of the proposed or existing water right.66
While conducting such an investigation, the State Engineer often encounters and gathers
information from non-parties who inform his decision and who may or may not be
referenced in the State Engineer's order. While Roy City approached the State Engineer

Appellant's Br., Addendum B, at 1 (emphasis supplied).
See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1 )(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
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in the proceeding below, for de novo review purposes the City should be included with
all those who provide information to the State Engineer but who, because they failed to
timely protest an application,67 cannot influence the judicial review of the State Engineer
decision by becoming parties in the judicial action.
Because the State Engineer may investigate firsthand,68 and is not constrained, as
is a court, to consider only the information that parties bring to his attention, he may
consider all information that he finds, or that is brought to him. Such discretionary
analysis differs from the consideration he gives protests filed by parties, however, which
he must consider.69 In other words, the State Engineer, at his discretion, may consider
or discard information he gathers in the course of the informal process - including a
letter like Roy City's.
The State Engineer has discretion to consider or disregard information brought
to him by non-party informants. If all such informants could intervene on de novo
review, the State Engineer would be constrained to evaluate all information, from
anyone, in his administrative process, regardless of when such information is provided
- depriving the State Engineer of significant agency discretion and authority. But, those
informants who provide information in the State Engineer's informal process are not

67

See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004).

68

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1 )(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).

69

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(2) (West 2004).
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entitled to intervene at a later stage of the proceedings any more than a material witness
is entitled to become a party at trial or on appeal of a trial court decision. An informant
who merely shares information (or evidence) with the State Engineer, cannot thereby
acquire the rights and privileges of a party who complies with applicable statutory
mandates.70
Once a party intervenes in a suit, the scope of its participation is limited only by
the party's interests and Rule 24.71 This virtually unlimited right to take part in an action
"encompasse[s] the right to litigate all [relevant] issues"72 and gives an intervenor all the
sanction she needs to begin molding - indeed completely reshaping — a case to her
wishes. Once ensconced, the intervenor may significantly impact the case, thus
disrupting a sometimes precarious equilibrium between existing parties and introducing
a very real "wild-card" into the de novo review. Even when it would benefit the State

70

See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004). Even assuming, arguendo, that
non-parties may intervene on de novo review, intervention should be limited to
informants who file an untimely protest that was, or practically could have been,
evaluated and responded to by the parties and the agency before the State Engineer
issues his order. Such a limitation at least provides notice to the parties of potential
issues and would prevent a person from completely bypassing the agency proceeding
- preserving some of the State Engineer's discretion in handling information from
informants and allowing the State Engineer at least some opportunity to comment on
the issues. However, as explained, even this level of participation renders Utah Code
Ann. § 73-3-7 (allowing 20 days to protest and become a party) and § 63G-4-102(l)
(limiting parties to those defined under § 63G-4-103(f)) void and minimizes the
efficacy of the State Engineer's proceedings.
71

Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 259 & n.5 (Utah 1997).

72

Id. at 258.
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Engineer, which is the case here, such participation should be disallowed because it
makes the de novo review into a new and different proceeding.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State Engineer respectfully requests the Court to
affirm the District Court's Order Denying Roy City's Motion to Intervene.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because the procedural posture of this case presents a unique situation that this
Court should address, and because oral argument would help the Court understand this
procedural posture, Defendant State Engineer respectfully requests oral argument in this
matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of April, 2009.
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